The Agility Crisis at the Heart of Modern Insecurity

By Anuoluwapo Idowu.

A major concern facing governments around the world today is how groups that operate outside the law have become faster, more adaptable, and in many cases, more effective than the institutions meant to deliver on the most fundamental rights of its people: protection of lives and properties.

From the forests of Nigeria to the regions of the Sahel, insurgent groups, bandits, and terrorist organisations continue to highlight a key weakness in modern governance.

Sadly, the issue is not that these groups have more resources than the state; they do not. The issue is that they have something governments are increasingly struggling to maintain: agility.

What could that be?

While governments rely on various layers of approvals, procedures, budget controls, legal reviews, and political considerations, non-state actors make decisions quickly.

A bandit leader can move an operational base overnight. An insurgent group can change tactics within days. A terrorist cell can exploit a security gap before the agencies involved even finish their reports. The state often reacts to yesterday's threats while its enemies prepare for tomorrow's.

This advantage in agility is being further enhanced by technology.

Modern armed groups increasingly use encrypted communications, commercial drones, satellite internet, social media for propaganda, and decentralised command structures. In several conflict areas, such as the Northeast of Nigeria, insurgent groups have shown an ability to adapt to new technologies faster than governments can acquire, approve, or deploy them. By the time state institutions complete procurement processes and engage in inter-agency discussions, their adversaries may already be using new tactics.

The problem extends beyond the battlefield into governance itself.

Democracies are built for accountability, not speed. Security reforms can take years to pass through legislative bodies, while criminal networks evolve within weeks. Nigeria’s long-standing debate over state policing is a clear example of this challenge. While policymakers continue to discuss constitutional changes, criminal groups continue to take advantage of gaps in intelligence, coordination, and response capabilities. The speed of violence often outpaces the speed of governance.

The financial impact is equally alarming.

According to the National Bureau of Statistics, Nigerian households paid approximately ₦2.23 trillion in ransom between May 2023 and April 2024. Additionally, SBM Intelligence reported that between July 2024 and June 2025, at least 4,722 Nigerians were kidnapped, with kidnappers collecting over ₦2.57 billion in ransom. These figures show that insecurity has become a self-sustaining enterprise. Unlike governments, which face costs such as salaries, pensions, procurement procedures, and administrative expenses, criminal organisations direct most of their resources into operations, logistics, recruitment, and weapons procurement.

This explains why communities often feel unprotected despite rising security budgets.

Citizens don't measure security institutions by how much money they receive; they judge them by the results. A government may invest trillions in defence and internal security, but if people continue to experience kidnappings, attacks, and slow responses, confidence in state institutions declines. In many rural areas, residents increasingly turn to vigilantes, hunters, and informal security networks because they perceive them as more responsive than formal institutions. When citizens start relying on these alternative forms of protection, the social contract begins to erode.

The consequences of allowing this imbalance to continue are serious.

Schools close. Businesses move away. Agricultural production declines. Communities are displaced. Worse still, citizens start to lose trust in the ability of democratic institutions to fulfil their most basic responsibility: protecting life and property. Across the Sahel, Afghanistan, Iraq, and parts of Nigeria, history has shown that the side that learns and adapts fastest gains the advantage, regardless of who has more resources.

Addressing this challenge requires more than just increasing security spending.

Governments must become more agile, intelligence-driven, and community-focused. Decision-making power should be closer to where operations take place. Security agencies must build stronger local intelligence networks and embrace technological innovation as fast as threats evolve. Legislatures must treat critical security reforms with urgency rather than political convenience. Above all, policymakers must recognise that security is not only a military issue; it is a governance issue. Communities with functioning schools, economic opportunities, accountable institutions, and trusted law enforcement are far less vulnerable to violent extremism and organised crime.

In the end, the defining security challenge of the twenty-first century is not about having the largest army.

It is about learning faster. Today, many non-state actors operate like agile startups, constantly adapting, innovating, and evolving. Governments, on the other hand, often function like large institutions hindered by bureaucracy and inertia.

If there was ever a score line, evidence suggests that non-state actors are winning the race for speed.

The real question is whether governments can reform quickly enough to close the gap before public trust becomes the next casualty. Because when armed groups consistently outpace the state, the biggest loss is not just security; it is citizens' faith in the institutions meant to protect them.